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Lavi v. Eighth Judicial District Court 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 38 (May. 29, 2014)1 
 
PROPERTY: DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS 
  
Summary 
 
 The Court determined whether waiver of the “one-action rule” of NRS 40.430 terminates 
the procedural requirements for bringing a deficiency judgment action within six months of 
foreclosure under NRS 40.455.   
 
Disposition 
 
 Waiver of the one-action rule allows the obligee to bring an action against the obligor 
prior to completing foreclosure on the property, but it does not terminate other procedural 
requirements, including the obligation to file for a deficiency judgment within six months after 
the foreclosure sale.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Petitioner Simon Lavi personally guaranteed a commercial real estate loan purchased by 
BB&T.  When the borrowers defaulted on the loan, BB&T filed a complaint seeking full 
recovery of the loan’s balance from Lavi and other guarantors.  While the case was pending, 
BB&T foreclosed on the property and took ownership through a credit bid at a trustee’s sale.  
The property was worth less than what the borrowers stilled owed under the loan. 
 Almost one year later, BB&T moved for summary judgment regarding Lavi’s breach of 
the loan guaranty.  Lavi claimed that NRS 40.455 prevented BB&T from obtaining a judgment 
for the deficiency on the loan balance arising after the trustee’s sale.  This is because NRS 
40.455 requires a party to file for a deficiency judgment within six months after the trustee’s 
sale.2 In granting BB&T’s motion for summary judgment, district court determined that BB&T 
notifying Lavi that it intended to seek a deficiency judgment was enough to satisfy the statute.  
 Lavi then sought a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition, asserting that BB&T was 
barred from recovering a deficiency judgment because it did not apply for it within six months 
after the trustee’s sale.  The Court agreed and issued the writ of mandamus, leading to the 
dismissal of the guaranty action.  BB&T petitioned the Court for rehearing.   
 
Discussion 
 
The Court’s based its order granting the writ of mandamus, concluding that under NRS 
40.455 and Walters v. Eighth Judicial District Court3, a party seeking a deficiency judgment 
must request the judgment within six months after selling the property at a trustee’s sale, 
regardless of any waiver of the one-action rule.  Thus, Lavi was allowed to assert BB&T’s 
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failure to timely apply for a deficiency judgment as a defense to the breach of guaranty action.4  
Walters involved a similar situation, where a lender sold the real property securing the loan at a 
trustee’s sale, and failed to apply for a deficiency judgment within six months after the trustee’s 
sale entitled a guarantor, who waived the one-action rule.5  In that case, the Court held that the 
lender’s motion for summary judgment sufficed as an application for a default judgment because 
it was written and set forth the particular grounds for relief within six months of the trustee’s 
sale.6   
Generally, “there may be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or for the 
enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage or other lien upon real estate.”7  This statute 
requires an obligee to foreclosure before attempting to recover from the loan’s guarantor.  If the 
guarantor waives the NRS 40.430 “one-action” protections, the obligee may maintain an action 
to recover from the guarantor before completing the foreclosure process.8  However, waiving the 
one-action rule does not also free an obligee from complying with NRS 40.455’s requirement to 
request a deficiency judgment within six months of foreclosure, as these procedural requirements 
cannot be terminated through waiver.   
Also, if an obligee seeks a deficiency judgment from a guarantor in an action separate 
from a foreclosure action, the two actions are clearly connected, as the foreclosure sale 
necessarily impacts the deficiency judgment.9  Allowing the defense to a deficiency action 
preserves the obligor’s rights under the antideficiency statutes and it does not stop an obligee 
from maintaining that action separately from a foreclosure action.  Moreover, this notion is 
aligned with NRS 40.495’s 2011 amendment adding subsection 4, which does not deny 
applicability of the deficiency judgment defense or the six-month deadline; instead, it governs 
the amount due from the guarantor regardless of whether the property has been foreclosed.10   
Thus, Lavi waiving the one-rule action allowed BB&T to bring an action against him 
prior to the foreclosure of the property, but it did not terminate the procedural requirements for 
asserting that separate action.  Once the property was foreclosed and a deficiency judgment was 
sought, BB&T still had to satisfy NRS 40.455.  Therefore, Lavi was able to raise his defense to 
BB&T’s attempt to recover from a deficiency judgment.  The Court distinguished this case from 
Walters, noting in Walters the summary judgment motion was filed within six months after the 
foreclosure sale, whereas here, BB&T filed the complaint before the trustee’s sale and delayed 
the motion for summary judgment for one year.  Accordingly, the Court denied BB&T’s petition 
for rehearing.11  
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Conclusion 
 
 A right to deficiency judgment does not vest until the property is sold.  Therefore, a 
complaint filed before the foreclosure sale cannot sufficiently put an obligor on notice that the 
deed of trust beneficiary intends to seek further recovery from the obligor. 
